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Extending Excelsior
LEONARD BIERMAN*
INTRODUCTION
In a recent Note in this Journal,1 Randall J. White suggested the develop-
ment of a new model for conducting labor union representation elections, and
critiqued the model for reform of this area which I had developed in previous
writings.2 Mr. White argued that employers have "built-in" advantages in the
conduct of labor representation elections of a kind which deprive unions (and
ultimately employees) of "fair and equal access to the organizational
debate."3 To ameliorate this situation, he cited to and suggested a reform that
I had already put forward, that of extending the scope of the National Labor
Relations Board's ("NLRB" or "Board") Excelsior Underwear, Inc.4
doctrine.5 Pursuant to the Excelsior doctrine, unions are presently able to
obtain the names and addresses of all voters in a particular labor bargaining
unit within seven days after the NLRB orders a union representation election
in that unit.' The reform of Excelsior ultimately suggested by Mr. White,
however, is considerably broader in scope than the one I had suggested, and
is designed to encourage union campaign visits to employee homes-a
campaign technique that I strongly opposed . Overall, Mr. White asserts that
while the reforms I had proposed in my earlier pieces are well-intentioned,
they do not in some respects go far enough, and that they merely represent
"the camel's nose in the tent flap."
8
The issues raised by Mr. White and my previous writings have recently
taken on increased importance with the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in the
case of Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB. 9 In Lechmere the Court's controversial new
member, Justice Clarence Thomas, in his first majority opinion, held that
employers can exclude nonemployee union organizers from employer property
even where such property (in this case a shopping center parking lot) is open
* Associate Professor, Graduate School of Business, Texas A&M University. The author thanks
Professors Reginald Alleyne, Rafael Gely, and Clyde W. Summers for their insights regarding the issues
discussed in this piece.
1. Randall J. White, Note, Union Representation Election Reform: Equal Access and the Excelsior
Rule, 67 IND. L.J. 129 (1991).
2. Leonard Bierman, Toward a New Model for Union Organizing: The Home Visits Doctrine and
Beyond, 27 B.C. L. REV. 1 (1985); Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and
Equal Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979) [hereinafter Penn
Comment].
3. White, supra note 1, at 131-32.
4. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
5. Bierman, supra note 2, at 28-30.
6. Excelsior, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1239-40.
7. See Bierman, supra note 2, at 27-28.
8. White, supra note 1, at 160.
9. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to the general public.' ° The Lechmere decision has considerable implications
for the continued viability of the Excelsior doctrine, and indeed has already
prompted some scholarly commentary."
This Article is a response to Mr. White's critique of my proposed reforms
in light of the Supreme Court's Lechmere decision. I will argue that the
Court's decision in Lechmere heightens the need for congressional reform of
the standards regulating labor representation elections and that this issue
should be high on the agenda of the recently formed Commission on the
Future of Worker-Management Relations. 2 I will further argue that the
reforms advocated by Mr. White in some respects go slightly too far and in
other respects not far enough, and that his proposals do not adequately protect
employee privacy rights. Finally, I will argue that Mr. White has miscon-
strued the potential effectiveness of the comprehensive and realistic reforms
I have already advocated.
I. THE EXCELSIOR/GENERAL ELECTRIC DOCTRINES AND HOME VISITS
As noted above, the NLRB in its seminal Excelsior decision held that
unions may obtain a list of employee names and addresses seven days after
a labor election has been scheduled. 3 Motivating the decision in Excelsior
was the idea that giving unions such lists will make them better able to reach
employees outside the workplace, thus offsetting what the NLRB has
recognized as employers' clear advantages in reaching employees on the
job.14 Indeed, Excelsior was decided in tandem with the case of General
Electric Co.,'5 where the Board denied unions the right to a worksite reply
to employer speeches given to employees at the job-site on paid company
time-so-called "captive audience" speeches.' 6 In short, the NLRB in the
General Electric/Excelsior companion cases developed something of a
compromise. Employers would have wide ranging abilities to reach (without
any meaningful union rights of access or reply) employees at the workplace,
while unions would now have enhanced opportunities to reach employees
outside the workplace.
10. Id. at 850. The majority opinion sparked a sharp dissent. Id. at 850-53 (White, J. dissenting)
(rejecting Justice Thomas' majority opinion and asserting that the Court should defer to the NLRB's
determination that Lechmere violated the National Labor Relations Act).
1I. See Leonard Bierman, Justice Thomas and Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB: A Reply to Professor
Robert A. Gorman, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 299 (1992); Robert A. Gorman, Union Access to Private
Property: A Critical Assessment of Leehmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 18 n.71 (1991).
12. The formation of the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations was
announced on March 24, 1993, in a Labor Department press release. Daily Labor Report, BNA, Mar.
26, 1993, available in LEXIS. That release stated that the purpose of the commission is to "investigate
methods to improve the productivity and global competitiveness of the American workplace.... The
Commission will investigate the current state of worker-management relations and labor law and make
recommendations concerning changes that may be needed to improve productivity through increased
worker-management cooperation and employee participation in the workplace." Id.
13. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. General Electric, 156 N.L.R.B. 1247 (1966).
16. Id. at 1251.
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To further cement this "compromise," the Board in these companion cases
explicitly upheld its so-called "home visits doctrine." 7 Pursuant to this
doctrine, developed in two 1957 cases, 8 unions are free to campaign by
visiting employees at their homes, while employers are prohibited from
engaging in such activity, in part because such visits by employers are seen
as having an unduly coercive effect given the power and control employers
exercise over workers.' 9 Thus, after General Electric/Excelsior employers
would still be unable to visit employees at their homes, while unions newly
armed with complete and accurate lists of names and addresses (which had
heretofore been very difficult for them to obtain) could take full advantage of
this campaign technique. In short, the NLRB viewed this new ability of
unions to meaningfully engage in home visits as a major counter-weight to the
advantages employers enjoyed from work site access to employees, and indeed
specifically deferred consideration of whether such an approach really
provided balanced opportunities for each side "until after the effects of
Excelsior become known.
20
It has been almost three decades since these cases were decided, and the
NLRB has never squarely reconsidered these issues. Legislation dealing with
these issues was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977, but
was successfully filibustered in the U.S. Senate in 1978.21
II. LECHMERE AND EXCELSIOR/GENERAL ELECTRIC
In its 1992 decision in Lechmere, the Supreme Court firmly reinforced the
general holding by the Board in General Electric and by the NLRB and courts
in other prominent cases,22 that absent extraordinary circumstances union
organizers cannot enter employer property to campaign.23 Lechmere itself
involved an attempt by union organizers to distribute handbills in a shopping
center parking lot during the early stages of an organizing campaign (before
a representation election had been scheduled). The union was trying to
organize the workers of a Connecticut retail store located in the shopping
center.24 The NLRB, using a "balancing" approach which considered the
"openness" and "closedness" of the property involved, permitted union access
to the property at issue, weighing heavily the fact that the parking lot was
freely accessible to the general public. 25 Justice Thomas' majority opinion
17. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1246 n.27 (1966).
18. Plant City Welding & Tank Co., 119 N.L.R1B. 131 (1957); Peoria Plastic Co., 117 N.L.R.B.
545 (1957).
19. Plant City Welding, 119 N.L.R.B. at 133-34.
20. General Electric, 156 N.L.R.B. at 1251.
21. See 123 CONG. REc. 32,613 (1977) (recording the passage of H.R. 8410, the Labor Reform Act
of 1977, by the House of Representatives), and 124 CONG. REc. 18,400 (1978) (recording the Senate's
successful filibuster of H.R. 8410).
22. See, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
23. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849-50.
24. Id. at 843-44.
25. Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92 (1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992); see also Gorman, supra
note 11, at 8-14.
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overruled the Board's holding, and essentially held that privatp property
remains private regardless of its specific nature and that union organizers are
simply not permitted on private property.2 6
Justice Thomas suggested that union organizers could reach employees
outside the workplace through various methods including mailings and home
visits.27 Justice Thomas also suggested that the' union could organize from
a forty-six foot-wide publicly-owned strip which was located between the
parking lot and the Connecticut Berlin Turnpike (a busy four-lane highway),
to which the union organizers had been relegated after they were thrown out
of the parking lot.28 The Court's holding in this case starkly illustrates the
practical problems in the operation of the Excelsior/General Electric doctrine
and the tremendous imbalance in organizational opportunities which exists in
the conduct of labor representation elections today.
First, one must remember that unions are, pursuant to Excelsior, given a list
of employee names and addresses seven days after a labor representation
election has been scheduled by the NLRB.29 But such elections are not
scheduled until the union has provided the NLRB with evidence that at least
thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit are interested in being
represented by the union.30 Moreover, most unions for strategic purposes, do
not seek to schedule such elections until at least fifty percent of the
employees have expressed such interest. 3' Thus, unions simply have no
rights to employee lists under Excelsior during the critical early stage of an
organizing campaign when they are trying to garner enough support to
actually have an election scheduled. Lechmere dramatically illustrates this
problem: union organizers were forced to stand on a narrow, publicly-owned,
grassy strip and record license plate numbers from cars parked in the
shopping mall parking lot in an attempt to obtain employee names and
addresses.32 Justice Thomas in Lechmere noted the union's "success" in
reaching employees via the names and addresses translated from the license
plates. 33 Justice Thomas further noted that the union generally had "reason-
able access" to employees of a kind which offset employer worksite access
and obviated the union's need to reach employees by coming onto the
employer's private property.34
But Justice Thomas' conclusions as to union "success" and "access" are
both open to dispute. First, even through its assiduous (some may say
26. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 849-50.
27. Id. at 849.
28. Id. at 849-50.
29. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18 (1981).
3 1. Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers"Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1776-77 n.22 (1983).
32. The union was apparently aided by the Connecticut Department of Motor Vehicles which gave
the union the names and addresses of the individuals whose cars carried the given license plates.
Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 844.
33. Id. at 844.
34. Id. at 849-50.
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"pathetic") effoits to obtain employee names and addresses, the union was
only able to obtain this information for about twenty percent of the workforce.
Simply put, the rights afforded unions under Excelsior come too late. Indeed,
in Lechmere the union never was able to marshall support to the point where
a representation election was scheduled and Excelsior rights were triggered.
Moreover, it is a bit disingenuous to believe that the types of access rights
afforded the union in Lechmere-handing out handbills from a grassy knoll
next to a busy highway-in any way effectively counterbalanced the
employer's ability to reach employees at the workplace. Indeed, the union's
inability to attain the thirty percent "showing of interest" necessary to
formally schedule an election,"' is itself a testimonial to the organizational
advantages of employers in the current construct. As Professor Howard
Lesnick has insightfully noted, "[w]hen an employer gathers his employees for
a group meeting on paid company time to deliver an antiunion speech, [the
employer] is implicitly telling [the employees] that he cares more about their
position on unionization than about their work. '36 It is hard to think of a
more potent weapon in the organizational arsenal. Even, for example, if a
union is able to jump through all the requisite "hoops," obtain an employee's
home address, and visit the employee at his home, no person can be a
"captive audience" in his or her own home where he or she may be distracted
by numerous other responsibilities and relationships.3 7 Under the current
construct, organizational advantages clearly lie with employers. Employers'
ability to reach employees at the workplace and the inability of unions
(especially after Lechmere) to do so, outweigh any advantages unions have in
reaching employees at their homes or in other ways outside work. This is
particularly the case because under the present regulatory scheme unions are
not given Excelsior lists of employee names and addresses until after they
have already demonstrated a substantial "showing of interest" from employ-
ees.
38
The Supreme Court's decision in Lechmere illustrates and supports the
contentions made by both Mr. White and myself that the current standards
governing labor representation elections are not effective and are unduly
biased in favor of employers. Mr. White and I differ, though, in our
approaches to reform.
35. 29 C.F.R. § 101.18.
36. Penn Comment, supra note 2, at 780 & n.148 (citing transcript of television program "The
Advocates: Should Congress Provide More Protection for Union Organizing?" at 17 (Apr. 27, 1978)
(statement by Professor Howard Lesnick)).
37. Jay Gresham, Note, Still as Strangers: Non-Employee Union Organizers on Private Commercial
Property, 62 TEX. L. REV. 111, 159 & n.276 (1983).
38. Lechmere, 112 S. Ct. at 1239-40.
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III. MR. WHITE'S "HOME VISIT" APPROACH TO REFORM VERSUS
MY COMPREHENSIVE SET OF REFORMS
Mr. White advocates a broad extension of the Excelsior doctrine to
ameliorate the perceived imbalance in organizational rights between unions
and employers.3 Indeed, he argues that unions should be furnished Excelsior
lists of employee names and addresses "on demand" at any time during an
organizing campaign. 40 To institute this reform, employers would be
regularly required, "perhaps annually or biannually," to furnish the NLRB
with employee name and address lists which the Board would then turn over
on request to any union.'
Mr. White views this as a "politically acceptable" reform because it avoids
greater union encroachment on employer property rights.42 He also views this
as an "effective" reform, in that it will enable unions to offset employers'
organizational advantages by permitting them to begin campaigning "as early
as the employer is able to campaign. '43 Under Mr. White's proposed
reforms, unions will no longer have to wait until seven days after a represen-
tation election has been scheduled (and the union has demonstrated a
"showing of interest" from at least thirty percent of the relevant workforce)
to obtain a comprehensive list of employee names and addresses.
One of the primary reasons why Mr. White views providing unions with "on
demand" Excelsior lists as being a positive and meaningful reform is that it
will "allow unions to make much more effective use of the home visit."44 He
views the home visit as a critically important organizing tool because it is one
of the primary ways unions are able to make personal contact with employ-
ees.
45
While I agree with Mr. White's thesis that there is an imbalance in
organizational rights between unions and employers which operates against
unions and needs to be ameliorated, the approach I have advocated is
considerably different from that advocated by Mr. White. At the heart of my
approach is the abolition of the "home visits doctrine" and concomitant
legislative prohibitions on home visits by either employees or unions. I have
argued that union home visits are not an especially effective organizing
technique, and that even if they are an effective organizing method the costs
they impose on employee privacy rights outweigh any such benefits. 46 I
recognized, though, that taking away the ability of unions to visit employees
at their homes (and thus an advantage they have over employers, because
employers are explicitly prohibited from making home visits) will leave
39. White, supra note 1, at 160-66.
40. Id. at 161-62.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 164.
43. Id. at 163.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Bierman, supra note 2, at 27-28.
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unions in a worse organizing position vis-a-vis employers than currently
47exists. 7
To rectify this situation and the overall imbalance in union/management
organizational rights, I have advocated a comprehensive set of reforms. 4 The
principal components of this set of reforms are: (1) NLRB sponsorship of
election debates; (2) greater organizational rights for off-duty employees, for
example, allowing off-duty employees more rights to distribute union
literature and related materials; (3) extending Excelsior-although not as far
as Mr. White suggests; (4) strengthening unfair practice remedies against
employers; (5) overturning the "home visits doctrine" and prohibiting unions
from making home visits; and (6) giving non-employee organizers the right
to enter employer premises to respond to employer "captive audience"
speeches. Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lechmere, reforms of
this kind are even more essential than when I first suggested them.
IV. THE PROBLEMS WITH MR. WHITE'S APPROACH AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A MORE EFFECTIVE SET OF REFORMS
A. The Home Visits Doctrine
At the heart of my disagreement with Mr. White's approach to labor
representation election reform is the tack he takes with respect to the "home
visits doctrine." As noted above, a critical byproduct of his proposed
extension of the Excelsior doctrine would be the increased ability of unions
to campaign by visiting employees at their homes. Because he argues against
the viability of any basic reform of the Supreme Court's holding in Babcock
& Wilcox (which the Court upheld in the Lechmere decision), pursuant to
which union organizers are broadly excluded from employer property,49
home visits would become the primary way unions are able to obtain the
personal contact with employees which he states "is so relevant to the voting
decision."50 Indeed, he emphasizes specifically the fact that the home visit
is the "one sure tool" unions have "for contacting employees personally."51
Mr. White does acknowledge points I have raised in my earlier writing
regarding the logistical difficulties unions face in conducting home visits. 2
He also notes my previous arguments regarding how such visits represent a
significant incursion on employee rights of privacy. 3 Nevertheless, Mr.
White feels that the "most significant" problem with the current home visits
doctrine is the lack of union access to employee "names and addresses early
47. Id. at 28.
48. Id. at 27-34.
49. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1956).
50. White, supra note 1, at 163.
51. Id. at 160.
52. Id.; see Bierman, supra note 2, at 8-20.
53. White, supra note 1, at 148.
19941
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enough in the campaign to use the home visit effectively."54 His central
proposal of extending the Excelsior doctrine by giving unions "on demand"
employee name and address lists at any time during the campaign, would thus
ameliorate this situation and arguably make home visits an effective campaign
technique.
While making Excelsior lists available earlier does indeed make the home
visit a more useful union campaign technique, it does not really alter the basic
flaws of the home visits doctrine. First, regardless of how effective a union
organizing technique the home visit is, there are strong arguments that such
visits unduly encroach upon employee privacy rights."5 The Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of the home as a place where individuals
should enjoy special privacy rights.56 This seems particularly applicable to
home visits given the advent of the two worker family and the need for
employees to have some sort of safe haven where they escape from work.
Also, arguments differentiating union home visits from potential visits by
employers, which are currently outlawed in part because they would be
"coercive" and "harassing," are a bit specious. One need only read some of
the recent writings by Professor Clyde W. Summers and others regarding the
organized criminal infestation of some unions to conjecture that visits to one's
home by certain union officials might well be quite "intimidating. 57
Certainly, it might not be particularly advisable for employees to follow the
advice some employers have given them to "slam the door in the union's
faces" when some unions come calling.5 8
Mr. White acknowledges these possible problems of harassment and
invasions of privacy, but points to the fact that these problems can be dealt
with "remedially" and through appropriate NLRB "administrative guide-
lines. '59 He also points to the free speech rights involved in allowing unions
to present their case to employees, and to giving employees the right to have
such ideas communicated to them. 60 Finally, he quotes a case which states
that the "average American citizen is a ... fairly intelligent, independent and
courageous man, and if he doesn't want to hear what the UAW or UMW has
to say he can very quickly turn his back."'"
54. Id.
55. See Bierman, supra note 2, at 18-20. See generally Julius G. Getman, Ruminations on Union
Organizing in the Private Sector, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 45, 60 (1986) (advocating one-on-one meetings
with employees, getting to know rank-and-file members, and conveying a personal interest in employees
as effective union campaign strategies).
56. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the power to regulate obscenity
does not extend to mere possesion of obscene material by an individual in the privacy of his own
home); see also Bierman, supra note 2, at 20.
57. Randy M. Mastro et al., Private Plaintif's Use of Equitable Remedies Under the RICO Statute:
A Means to Reform Corrupted Labor Unions, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 571 (1991); Clyde W. Summers,
Union Trusteeships and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 689 (1991).
58. See Ripley Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. 1132, 1140-41 (1963).
59. White, supra note 1, at 165.
60. Id. at 166.
61. Id. at 166 n.229.
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I question, though, as I have noted previously, the ability of the NLRB to
realistically remedy or develop administrative guidelines in this area. How is
an employee, absent perhaps a video cassette recording of the entire visit,
actually going to prove that what union officials said to him was "coercive"?
Moreover, what types of speech or action are, presuming an accurate
recording of events, going to be deemed illegally "coercive" or "harassing"
in this context? When possible reform of thp home visits doctrine was before
the U.S. House of Representatives in 1977-1978, as part of the proposed
Labor Law Reform Act, this issue proved to be a major stumbling block.62
In addition, while I concede that there are important free speech issues
involved in home visits by unions, I do not think these considerations are
controlling or that they outweigh the costs these visits impose. The Supreme
Court has emphasized in other contexts the free speech value of door-to-door
solicitation, but I agree with Professor Derek Bok that these decisions are not
legally binding in this context, and that there are considerable differences
between labor election home visits and door-to-door solicitations involving the
sale of life insurance or encyclopedias.63 Further, while some employees may
indeed be courageous enough to turn their backs on the United Auto Workers
or United Mine Workers, it seems unfair to place this burden on employees,
and unrealistic to expect employees to be as courageous when the union
involved is one with perhaps more of a rough-and-tumble reputation.
Finally, apart from the issues of employee privacy raised by the home visits
doctrine, I question how effective a campaign method of union home visits
would be even given the kind of extension of the Excelsior doctrine proposed
by Mr. White. In his piece Mr. White notes, but gives rather short shrift to,
the concerns I have expressed regarding the suburbanization of the American
workforce and the impact of this development on the home visits doctrine.'
In this regard, it must be remembered that the Supreme Court's decision in
Babcock denying union access to employer property turned in significant
degree on the fact that forty percent of the company's employees lived in a
small town only one mile from the jobsite, and were thus arguably easily
accessible to the union off working premises. 65 Today, however, employees
tend to live scattered over wide areas, often driving long distances to work.
The result is that unions, even armed early with complete lists of employee
names and addresses, face a rather daunting task in reaching employees at
their homes.
In short, unions today operate in a considerably different environment than
they did in 1956, when the Court decided Babcock, and in 1957, when the
home visits doctrine was developed. Employees generally do not live in
company towns or otherwise live together in close proximity to their
workplaces. This makes home visits difficult for unions under any
62. Bierman, supra note 2, at 22-23; see H.R. REP,. No. 637, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 71 (1977).
63. See Derek C. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 100 (1964).
64. Bierman, supra note 2, at 10-12.
65. N.L.R.B. v. Babcock & Wilcox, Co., 351 U.S. 105, 106, 111-14 (1956).
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circumstances, and raises the question whether reform of the basic Bab-
cocklLechmere doctrine is really necessary. As one leading observer has put
it, "[s]uburbanization has also meant that employee residences are scattered
over wide areas. As it becomes increasingly difficult for union representatives
to communicate with employees ... the need for access to the employer's
property becomes more important."'66
Central to Mr. White's proposed reforms is the increased use of home visits
by unions. Such visits unduly intrude on employee privacy rights, and have
the potential for being unlawfully harassing and coercive. Because of recent
demographic shifts, such visits are difficult for unions to conduct even if they
do have "on demand" lists of employee names and addresses. All labor
campaign home visits should be outlawed, and other reforms, including
granting unions the right to participate in election debates, should be
implemented.
B. Election Debates and Beyond
Mr. White and I also disagree significantly about potential union access to
the workplace. My view that the right of unions to engage in home visits
should be abolished, lead me to suggest a wide range of other reforms
designed to offset this loss for unions and to create a better balance in
union/management organizational access. Direct union access to employer
workplaces, at least for the purpose of participating in election debates, will
help achieve this balance.
While Mr. White does not address my election debate proposals in his Note,
he does discuss at considerable length possible renunciation of the Babcock
& Wilcox rule and potential reinstatement of a union right to reply to
employer "captive audience speeches. 67 With respect to possible reform of
the Babcock rule, he discusses the unlikelihood of either Congress or the
courts initiating change in this area.68 Mr. White notes, however, that the
creation of a union right of reply to employer "captive audience speeches"
would be "potentially more acceptable" than broad-scale reform of the
Babcock doctrine.69 Mr. White points out one possible shortfall of this
reform: employers would have an easy way around this reform in that they
could simply not give speeches of this kind.7" More specifically, he argues
that giving unions the right to reply to employer "captive audience speeches"
would be a "union victory that rings hollow" because employers would simply
avoid such speeches and emphasize other sorts of campaign techniques.7' In
the end, union/management organizational access rights would, according to
66. Michael A. Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction over Concerted Trespassory Union
Activity, 83 HARv. L. REV. 552, 553 (1970).
67. White, supra note 1, at 154-59.
68. Id. at 154-57 & 156 n.167.
69. Id. at 158.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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him, not be equalized and employers would be left "in much the same position
of strength and control" that they currently enjoy.7 2
On this point I differ with Mr. White. As I have noted above,73 and as
empirical studies of the subject have documented, 4 the captive audience
speech is probably the most potent weapon in the employer's organizational
arsenal. The potency of this employer weapon is clearly diminished to the
extent unions are (assuming all the various possible logistical difficulties are
worked out) given a right to reply to such speeches. If the end result, as Mr.
White suggests it will be, is that employers will simply stop giving such
speeches in order to avoid giving unions opportunities for replies, I do not
view this as a negative thing or, as he would put it, a "hollow victory.""
Certainly it is true, as Mr. White points out, that in the absence of giving
captive audience speeches employers will "refocus" their campaign strategies
and "rely on appealing to workers on an individual basis. ' 76 But because this
method of employer campaigning is less effective than the captive audience
speech situation where an employer is able to call all workers together and
address them on paid company time, I would view the overall impact of such
a change to be a net benefit for unions.77
Some of the extraordinary attention paid over the years to the issue of
employer captive audience speeches and possible union replies to such
speeches78 should instead be focused on the possibility of having labor
representation election debates. I have suggested that Congress seriously
consider authorizing the NLRB to sponsor a series of preelection debates.
While working out the precise details and logistics of such debates may be
difficult, they would go a long way toward fostering the central goal of the
Labor Act-promoting "free debate on issues dividing labor and manage-
ment."79 Such debate would both help insure an informed and educated
electorate, and enable unions to get their message across on an equal basis
with employers despite the inability to engage in home visits. Although Mr.
White does not discuss the possibility of a reform of this kind, I believe it is
one worthy of careful attention.
72. Id.
73. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
74. See Gresham, supra note 37, at 152-53, 153 n.244.
75. White, supra note 1, at 158.
76. Id.
77. 1 understand that this point is clearly debatable and turns in significant measure on the perceived
potency of the employer's "captive audience speech."
78. See, e.g., Livingston Shirt Corp., 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953); Bonwit Teller, Inc., 96 N.L.I.B.
608 (1951); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948); Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.RB. 802 (1946).
79. See Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
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C. Possible Logistical Problems with "On Demand" Excelsior
Mr. White recognizes that there are possibilities of abuse in implementing
his proposal of furnishing Excelsior lists to unions "on demand."8 He notes,
however, that the NLRB, "through its expertise, can protect against abuse by
adopting appropriate administrative guidelines and conditions" regarding the
release of such lists and develop "meaningful sanctions for violations."8' I
am somewhat less sanguine than Mr. White about the Board's "expertise" in
this regard, 2 and, as I have pointed out, I am somewhat concerned about the
possible role of so-called "intervenor unions" (other unions who win a place
on the election ballot in addition to the primary "petitioning union") in a
scheme of this kind. In addition, many unions try to keep the early stages of
their organizing efforts secret in an attempt to gain tactical advantages over
employers.83 Thus, even if a reform of the kind Mr. White suggests were
adopted, many unions might not take full advantage of it. Nevertheless, the
general notion of extending the reach of the Excelsior doctrine is a positive
one, and I commend Mr. White for his scholarly discourse on this subject.
CONCLUSION
Mr. White, in his recent Note in this Journal, has outlined the current
imbalance in organizational rights in labor representation elections, and the
need for reform in this area. The Supreme Court's recent decision in
Lechmere further exacerbates this imbalance, and accentuates the existence of
employer advantages over unions in the organizational context. While I
disagree with some of Mr. White's specific proposals, and feel strongly that
the insidious home visits doctrine should be abolished and that neither unions
nor employers should be permitted to campaign in this manner, it is important
not to lose the proverbial "forest for the trees." I agree strongly with Mr.
White that general reform in this area is necessary, and urge the recently
formed Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations to make
meaningful recommendations to serve as a precursor to congressional action.
80. White, supra note 1, at 165.
81. Id. at 165 & n.224.
82. For an interesting general critique of NLRB "expertise" in the conduct of labor representation
elections, see Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988 (1984).
83. KEN GAGALA, UNION ORGANIZING AND STAYING ORGANIZED 150 (1983).
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